

Joshua Landry
Assistant Professor
Oklahoma State University

joshuadlandry.com
josh.landry@okstate.edu

Research Interests

International Conflict Processes, International Security, War, Arming, Alliances, Military Coalitions, Formal Theory, Statistical Modeling

Appointments

Assistant Professor, <i>Oklahoma State University</i>	August 2024 - Present
Visiting Assistant Professor, <i>Oklahoma State University</i>	August 2023 - May 2024

Education

PhD, Government, <i>The University of Texas at Austin</i>	August 2023
M.A., Government, <i>The University of Texas at Austin</i>	December 2018
Other Training:	
Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models Summer Institute	Summer 2022
ICPSR Summer Program in Quantitative Methods of Social Research	Summer 2019
B.A., Political Science, <i>Transylvania University</i>	May 2015

Peer-Reviewed Publications

Scott Wolford, Joshua Landry and Kevin Galambos. 2026. Collective Deterrence. *International Organization* 80(3): 602-639.

Roman Hlatky and Joshua Landry. 2025. Ethnic Preferences, Domestic Audiences and Military Coalition Formation. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 42(1): 32-55.

Working Papers

The Politics of Arming, Preventive War, and War Aims - *Under Review*

Ethnic Politics and Alliance Formation (with Roman Hlatky) - *R&R at International Studies Quarterly*

Interstate War Demobilization: How Domestic Political Pressure Shapes Interstate Peace Settlements - *Awarded Best Paper at the Formal Models of Conflict Conference, October 2024*

Works in Progress

The Politics of War Mobilization and Conflict Initiation

Affective Polarization and International Conflict (with Cole Harvey)

External Intervention and Use of *Fait Accomplis*

War Termination and Changes in the Distribution of Power in the International System

Dissertation

The Politics of Arming, Postwar Power, and War Outcomes

My dissertation explains why a war's outcome is often an unreliable predictor of the postwar distribution of power among participants. I find that war outcome most directly shapes postwar power when a victorious government pursues war goals intended to constraint their opponent's ability to invest in their military following the war, such as installing a new government, or annexing territory. Governments are most likely to pursue such goals when they expect domestic political constraints will limit their own ability to invest in the military in the future. Therefore, expectations about the postwar distribution of power, a product of the domestic political economy of military investment, shape war outcomes, rather than reflecting them. My findings help us understand when and why governments pursue more ambitious war goals, when war changes the distribution of power in the international system, and as a consequence, when war changes who exerts the most influence in international politics, and whose interests and values take precedence the international arena.

Teaching Experience

Instructor, Graduate-Level:

POLS 5153: American Foreign Policy - Spring 2026

POLS 5203: ProSeminar in International Relations - Fall 2025

Instructor, Undergraduate-Level:

POLS 2213: Fundamentals of Political Science - Fall, Spring 2025, Spring 2026

POLS 4010: International Security - Fall 2024

POLS 4013: American Foreign Policy - Fall 2024, Spring 2026

POLS 1113: American Government - Spring 2024, Fall 2023

GOV 312L: International Security - Spring 2022

GOV 360I: Politics of International Trade (with Nate Jensen) - Fall 2020

Graduate Teaching Assistant:

GOV 385N: Introduction to Formal Political Analysis - Spring 2020, Spring 2019

Peer Reviews Completed

Conflict Management and Peace Science, International Interactions, International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Quarterly Journal of Political Science

Conference Presentations

International Studies Association Conference, March 2026 - Interstate War Demobilization: How Pressure to Demobilize Shapes Peace Settlements

American Political Science Association Conference, September 2025 - The Politics of War Mobilization and Conflict Initiation

Formal Models of Conflict Conference, October 2024 - Interstate War Demobilization: How Pressure to Demobilize Shapes Peace Settlements (Awarded Best Paper)

Midwest Political Science Association Conference, April 2024 - Ethnic Politics and Alliance Formation

International Studies Association Conference, March 2023 - The Politics of Arming, Postwar Power, and War Outcomes

Peace Science Society Conference, November 2022 - Interstate War Demobilization: How Domestic Political Pressure Shapes Interstate Peace Settlements

International Studies Association Conference, March 2022 - Arming Costs, Coalition Wars, and Postwar Military Power

Midwest Political Science Conference, April 2021 - Arming Costs, War Outcomes, and Post-war Military Power

Texas Triangle International Relations Conference, January 2020 - Ethnic Proximity and Military Coalition Formation (co-authored with Roman Hlatky)

Grants and Awards

Best Paper, Formal Models of Conflict Conference 2024

Clements Center Graduate Fellow: Fall 2017-Spring 2023

Peace Science Society Travel Grant: Fall 2022 (\$400)

UT Summer Research Fellowship: Summer 2022 (\$6000)

Graduate School Fellowship: Fall 2021 (\$20010)

Graduate Continuing Fellowship: Spring 2021 (\$16350)

UT Summer Research Fellowship: Summer 2020, 2019 (\$5000)

UT ICPSR Fellowship: Summer 2019 (\$1800)

Clements Center Grant in History, Strategy, and Statecraft: Summer 2019 (\$2500)

UT Predissertation Summer Fellowship: Summer 2018 (\$3500)

UT Departmental Fellowship: Fall 2020, Spring 2020, Fall 2019, Spring 2019, Fall 2018, Spring 2018, Fall 2017, Spring 2017, Fall 2016 (\$2500)

Professional Memberships

International Studies Association: Spring 2020-Present

Peace Science Society: Fall 2017-Present

American Political Science Association: Fall 2016-Present