Working Papers:
The Politics of Arming, Preventive War, and War Aims, Under Review
Explanations of war due to commitment problems or ``costly peace'' illustrate why states initiate war to pursue aims which, if imposed, eliminate an opponent as a future threat to security or interests. Yet, in some cases such aims emerge after war's onset. I analyze a two-player model of war onset, aims, termination, and postwar arming which illustrates how expansive war aims may emerge after war's onset, rather than before: uncertainty over the effect of war on a state's future costs of arming. Consistent with commitment problem- or costly peace-driven war aims, sufficiently high future costs of arming motivate war aims which remove an opponent as a future threat, thereby removing the need to arm. Under complete information, expected war aims do not change between war's onset and termination. However, the introduction of uncertainty over the consequences of war for a state's future costs of arming permits the existence of wars which, at onset, are expected to be limited in scale, but expand after war fighting begins. I then illustrate how the model explains the war aims of the Chilean government in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883).
Collective Deterrence (with Kevin Galambos and Scott Wolford), Revise & Resubmit
We analyze a model of collective deterrence in which (a) a revisionist may challenge a status quo defended by a great power and multiple potential coalition partners, (b) the status quo generates public goods for its defenders, and (c) defenders' war costs are private information. We show first that higher potential capabilities encourage all defenders to fight, but more potential partners makes the great power more and other partners less likely to fight. Second, deterrence failures are more likely when great power commitments are less certain and potential coalitions are larger, but these weaknesses can be offset by increasing potential military capabilities. Third, system stability decreases in the size of status quo coalitions and great power commitment but increases in potential capabilities. Finally, we derive a public-goods version of the size principle, where overlarge coalitions lead not to post-victory conflict but to deterrence failures.
Ethnic Politics and Alliance Formation (with Roman Hlatky), Under Review
Does co-ethnicity motivate alliance formation? We argue co-ethnic governments form alliances to either protect their own regime from potential threats or their protect the regime of their alliance partner. Further, the specific obligations included in alliance agreements reached by co-ethnic governments will reflect the nature of the threat to each regime. Internal threats from ethnic minorities motivate co-ethnic governments to form consultation agreements, while external security threats lead to defense pacts. Using data including 8,785 directed-dyads from 1946-2003, we find evidence the effect of co-ethnicity on alliance formation depends on (a) the nature of the threat (internal vs external) each government faces, and (b) the type of alliance formed.
Interstate War Demobilization: How Domestic Political Pressure Shapes Interstate Peace Settlements, awarded Best Paper at the Formal Models of Conflict Conference (October, 2024)
Theories of domestic politics and wartime bargaining between countries generally end when the shooting stops. How do domestic politics continue to shape interstate bargaining following ceasefire? I analyze a formal model in which a government seeks to maximize its gains while negotiating a peace settlement while subject to removal from office by its domestic public. When leaders face political punishment for failing to demobilize their military, fear of losing office motivates them to begin sending soldiers home, reducing their bargaining power during peace negotiations. However, leaders may expect greater political costs should they begin demobilization, such as unemployment and inflation created by returning soldiers and reversion to a peacetime economy. In this case, leaders are incentivized to remain mobilized throughout peace negotiations, improving their negotiating position in comparison.
Dissertation:
The Politics of Arming, Postwar Power, and War Outcomes
My dissertation explains why a war's outcome is often an unreliable predictor of the postwar distribution of power among participants. I find that war outcome most directly shapes postwar power when a victorious government pursues war goals intended to constraint their opponent's ability to invest in their military following the war, such as installing a new government, or annexing territory. Governments are most likely to pursue such goals when they expect domestic political constraints will limit their own ability to invest in the military in the future. Therefore, expectations about the postwar distribution of power, a product of the domestic political economy of military investment, shape war outcomes, rather than reflecting them. My findings help us understand when and why governments pursue more ambitious war goals, when war changes the distribution of power in the international system, and as a consequence, when war changes who exerts the most influence in international politics, and whose interests and values take precedence the international arena.
Works in Progress:
The Politics of Military Mobilization and Conflict Initiation
Affective Polarization and Diversionary Conflict
War and Changes in the Distribution of Power